Now that the Middle East dust has had time to settle somewhat, it may be possible to have a clearer view of the situation.
When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal last summer, Britain and France could have taken the matter to the United Nations, but did not. Instead, they called a conference in London and at the same time strengthened their military forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. They would have seized the Canal Zone had it not been for Washington's steady counsel for a peaceful settlement. Meanwhile, Colonel Nasser shrewdly kept the canal open so that none could charge him with interfering with free navigation, principally oil shipments, through the waterway.
In view of the importance of the Suez Canal to them, Britain and France would have been justified in going to war against Egypt if this should happen, say, 30 years ago. There was certainly enough provocation and the world would have approved. But time has changed, and with it the conceptions of people, including a sizeable section of those in Britain herself, who would strongly oppose any resort to force over the Suez Canal dispute in the summer of 1956. To this extent, the world may be said to have progressed in recent years.
The main current in the Middle East today is nationalism. Arab nations from Morocco in the west to the Persian Gulf in the east have either won or demanded independence. Egypt, because of her ancient civilization and her strategic position, is the pivot. Presumably it was in recognition of this fact that Britain has over the years taken steps to restore sovereignty to Egypt, and these steps culminated in the withdrawal of British forces from the Canal Zone earlier this year in accordance with an agreement signed in 1954. It must have been realized in London that once the British forces left, Britain would lose her ability to control the Canal Zone, and thenceforth she would have to rely on diplomacy in or outside of the United Nations to protect her interests there. From any point of view, therefore, her military action in conjunction with France and Israel against Egypt at this late stage was a deplorable mistake in its basic concept.
If Britain and France had acted last summer immediately after Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal, while there would have been opposition both at home and overseas, at least they could argue that they had acted under provocation. Instead, they waited for the storm of moral indignation to die down, and then four months later, they conspired with Israel and attacked Egypt, ostensibly to keep the Israeli and Egyptian forces apart and to protect shipping in the Suez Canal. It must be said that this was a poor alibi. Even if Britain and France should now claim that they had intervened in order to prevent a Soviet plot to seize the Middle East, they would not be able to convince the world of its truthfulness.
Even as a military campaign, the Anglo-French intervention left much to be desired. Apparently, there was no determination to march on to Cairo, let alone the occupation of Egypt as a whole. All the Anglo-French combined forces had to show for was a razed Port Said and a blocked canal. At the first intimation of Soviet intervention, they stopped to see what the United States would do to help them out of a precarious situation. Once they realized that Washington meant business when it said it considered itself under no obligation to come to their rescue, they gladly accepted a United Nations cease-fire order and agreed to evacuate the Suez Canal when a U. N. police force could take over. Israel, with which Britain and France have unwisely chosen to move against Egypt together, had to back down too and agree to evacuate the Sinai peninsula which her troops had occupied in a lightning attack.
The Arab-Israeli situation has been complicated and dangerous enough without Britain and France taking side with either one of the parties involved. As great powers, their role should be that of a mediator, and not that of an active participant. The animosity between the Arab nations and Israel are deep-seated, and the least Britain and France could do would be to leave them alone, and hope that time would heal old wounds and make way for a "live and let live" understanding between the opponents. As a result of their armed intervention, Britain and France have become enemies in the eyes of the Arab nations. The loss to Britain was particularly great because the Baghdad Pact, which she had taken considerable trouble to set up as a bastion against Soviet Russia came apart when Iraq, because of the Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula openly supported Egypt against Britain and France.
By far a greater loss was sustained by the Western Alliance. To begin with, Britain and France kept the United States in the dark as to what they had intended to do. They went ahead, apparently on two suppositions. The first one was that Nasser would crumble the moment the Anglo-French combined forces moved against Egypt. This was soon disproved, as the Egyptian people rallied to their government. The second one was that the United States would come to their help in the end. This, however, did not happen. Their defiance of an American resolution in the United Nations calling for a peaceful settlement soon yielded to compliance as it became clear that Washington had not the slightest intention of backing them up in the event of Soviet armed intervention. Damage, however, has been done. The tripartite solidarity which has counted for much of the allied strength vis-a-vis Soviet threat in the Middle East and in other parts of the world has suffered a great discount at the very moment when it is needed most.
On the other hand, by their military action in the Canal Zone, Britain and France distracted the world's attention from Soviet Russia's brutal suppression of the revolt in Hungary. The Russians could retort that they had just as much business being in Hungary as British and French troops had in Egypt. In the uncommitted countries, this kind of argument, however specious it might sound, would go a long way to convincing them that it was a case of the kettle calling the pot black. Viewed from this standpoint, the Anglo-French action was a great disservice to the cause of the democracies as a whole.
Throughout the Suez Canal crisis, the United States has held to a steady course in favor of a peaceful settlement. Both the Dulles Plan adopted by the great majority of the nations which attended the London Conference, and the Canal Users' Association Plan which was evolved following the failure of the Menzies mission in Cairo, were compromises to give "face" and cash benefits to Egypt and a practical assurance of international operation to Britain and France. After they fell through, Washington came up with an alternative plan of by-passing the Suez Canal. The United States would make available both the tankers and foreign exchange needed for operation around the Cape of Good Hope. Britain and France made sudden decisions to attack Egypt in conjunction with Israel when this last plan was supposed to be under consideration. Of course, a case could have been made out to show that the United States, by withdrawing her offer to help Egypt build the High Aswan Dam, had actually brought on Nasser's nationalization order. The fact, however, remains that according to agreement the Suez Canal would have to be returned to Egypt in 1968 anyway, and what Egypt did was to shorten it by 12 or 13 years. It was a case for compensation and business bargaining, and that is what the United States tried to persuade Britain and France to do in vain. For if Britain had agreed to withdraw her troops from the Suez Canal, then to be consistent she should be prepared to return the Suez Canal to Egypt some day. If it should be thought that this way she would lose her sense of security over the continued use of the canal, then she should not have evacuated her troops from the area earlier in the year. France had even less reason to go into Egypt with an army. She went in to give vent to her displeasure at Egypt for alleged instigation of trouble in North Africa.
The failure of Britain and France to take the matter to the United Nations last summer when it first came up created the impression that the great powers, whenever it suited their own convenience, would ignore the world organization, which, as a result, suffered a loss in prestige. As it turned out, it was the United Nations which provided Britain and France with the ladder for them to come off the proverbial limb. Now that the vanguard of an international police force has arrived on the scene of the recent conflict to maintain peace, the nations concerned should abide by the United Nations resolutions and withdraw their armed forces from the Suez Canal and from the Sinai peninsula. They could argue out their dispute in the United Nations later on. This will restore to the world organization much of the prestige lost earlier in the crisis.
Of all the problems besetting the world today, the one in the Middle East is certainly the most complicated. In the first place, there is the age-old hatred between the Jews and the Arabs, a hatred accentuated since the creation of Israel in a sea of Arab nations. Israel's bellicosity has not endeared herself to her neighbors. Then there is the Arab nationalism against Old Colonialism. Rightly so the Arab nations all want political independence and a better standard of living. Any attempts on the part of the old colonial powers to hold on to their political and economic interests will necessarily be resented. A third factor contributing to the present tension is Soviet Russia's ambition to control the oil-rich region. By supplying Egypt with jet planes and tanks, she has started an arms race between Israel and the Arab nations so that she could fish in troubled waters. Unfortunately Britain and France have played right into the Soviet hands to make it possible for her to pose as a friend of the Arab nations and as a defender of peace and justice.
At the same time, it is hoped that Egypt has learned a lesson, as much from the Anglo-French military forces as from Soviet Russia's offer to send "volunteers." Its leaders should realize by now that the moment these so-called "volunteers" arrive, Egypt will be turned into one vast battlefield, and all her people's hopes for political independence and economic improvement will be dashed to pieces.
By refusing to associate herself with Britain and France in their ill-conceived venture, the United States has amply demonstrated her impartiality in the Suez Canal dispute. At the right moment, when Egypt has realized how close she was in becoming a ruined nation and a Soviet satellite, it is hoped that the United States will see her way clear to renewing her offer to help Egypt build up her economy, thereby keeping Egypt on this side of the Iron Curtain.